

# Using identity to empower your organisation

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# Agenda


- The businesses need for collaboration
- Securing the new collaborative architecture
- The need to separate identity
- What needs identifying
- Utilising identity within these new architectures
- Leveraging an assertion based model
- The need for a strong core identity
- Implication for SA Guidance v3.0
- Conclusions

# Understanding the collaboration driver

Connectivity


Today

Effective Perimeter Breakdown



Time

# Understanding the externalisation of data




The security of the network becomes increasingly irrelevant, and the security and integrity of the data becomes everything.

The mantra of any good security engineer is: "Security is a not a product, but a process."


It's more than designing strong cryptography into a system; it's designing the entire system such that all security measures, including cryptography, work together.

Bruce Schneier

# Today's Externalised Network



# Tomorrows Externalised Network



# Key principles for Next Generation Identity

## 1

### **Identity must be separated from Access Management**

- An Identity solution must provide identity to multiple, disparate, Entitlement and Access Management solutions
- Access Management must consume identity and entitlement from multiple sources.



# Key principles for Next Generation Identity

## 2

### **Identity is not just about people**

- Identity needs to encompass all objects that need to identify themselves
- This includes;
  - People
  - Devices
  - Code
  - Organisations
  - Agents.

# Key principles for Next Generation Identity



## **3 Federation of existing IAM system will not scale**

- Technically difficult
- n-factorial problem
- Transitive trusts problem
- Assertion (or claims) based solutions will allow scalability and flexibility.

**IdEA: Identity, Entitlement, Access**  
 Access granted dependent on assertions and rules & risk, not binary on Username

**Martini model<sup>1</sup>:** Any IP, any device, any time, anywhere

**Entitlement  
 (Risk Based Access)**



**Resource Attributes:**

- ◆ Location
- ◆ Classification
- ◆ AD Group
- ◆ etc.


**Rules based access:**  
 Using a mix of attributes,  
 based on risk assessment

**Bi-directional Trust<sup>2</sup>**


**Id / Attributes Asserted**

- ◆ User Identity
- ◆ User Assertions
- ◆ Credential strength / trust
- ◆ Location Assertions
  - ◆ IP-Address
  - ◆ Geo-location
  - ◆ GPS / GPRS
- ◆ Organisation Identity
- ◆ Organisation Assertions
- ◆ Device Identity
- ◆ Device Assertions
  - ◆ Functionality Required
  - ◆ Functionality Offered
  - ◆ Sandbox
  - ◆ Secure container
  - ◆ Cleanliness of device
- ◆ Code Identity
- ◆ Code Assertions





Entitlement  
(Risk Based Access)



## Attributes (or claims) to make risk based decisions

- "I am a qualified doctor"  
*and*
- "I want access to this drug data sheet"
  
- "I work for XXY organisation"  
*and*
- "I'm part of the "ZZZ" Project"  
*and*
- "I want to access the project area"  
*and*
- "I'm a device that can provide a secure sandbox"
  
- "I'm a British Citizen"  
*and*
- "I want to enter the UK"

# Key principles for Next Generation Identity

## 4

### **Strong identity is key to trust and collaboration on the Internet**

- The lack of Strong Identity is hindering adoption
- People operate with facets (or persona)
- Strong core identity (with a one-way trust) is key to making this work
- People must own their own core identity
- Escalating individual persona to a pseudo-core will fail.

# Core Identity

Paul Simmonds

Security  
Professional



White Water Kayak  
Instructor



# The need for a one-way trust

Multiple Facets




Refugee



# Core Identity

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Facets (or Personas) of my *Core Identity*



The big lie of computer security is that security improves by imposing complex passwords on users.  
In real life, people write down anything they can't remember.  
Security is increased by designing for the way humans actually behave

Jakob Nielsen

# Jericho Forum work in the CSA Guidance

- 2.1 – Cloud Cube model
- In Guidance 3.0
  - Move from IAM to IdEA
  - Cloud Cube model - unchanged
  - Entitlement into Application Design
  - Re-written Domain 12  
Identity, Entitlement & Access Mgmt
  - Identity as a Service in (new) Domain 14

## DOMAIN 12 //

## IDENTITY, ENTITLEMENT, &amp; ACCESS MANAGEMENT

The concepts behind Identity, Entitlement, and Access Management used in traditional computing require fundamental changes in thinking when implementing a cloud environment, particularly splitting it into three discrete functions, Identity, Entitlement, and Authorization/Access Management (IdEA).

For most organizations, implementing a traditional application means implementing a server, possibly in a DMZ<sup>109</sup>, and in most cases tied into a Directory Service (DS)<sup>110</sup> (such as Microsoft's Active Directory, Novell's eDirectory or Open LDAP) for user authentication. In some cases it means implementing an application or using a web-delivered service using its own stand-alone authentication system, much to the annoyance of the users who then have to remember sets of credentials (or worse, reuse credentials from other, perhaps more trusted, domains).

In contrast, a well implemented cloud service or application-identity should be consumed from a variety of external sources together along with the associated attributes (remembering that an identity applies not only to Users<sup>111</sup>, but also Devices, Code<sup>112</sup>, Organizations and Agents which all have identity and attributes). Leveraging all the multiple identities and attributes involved in a transaction enables the cloud system to make better holistic risk-based decisions (defined by the entitlement process<sup>113</sup> and implemented by the authorization & access management components) about granular access to the system, processes, and data within the cloud system / application.

This process of using multiple sources of Identity and their related attributes is critical when a cloud application is likely to be Internet-facing, and is also likely to be one of the main hurdles for organizations wanting to use "true" cloud services and instead opt to implement virtualization technologies in their own DMZ connected to their own internal DS.

This de-perimeterized<sup>114</sup> approach to identity, entitlement, and access management provides a more flexible and secure approach but also can be implemented equally well inside the corporate boundary (or perimeter).

**Overview.** The following sections cover the key aspects of Identity, Entitlement, and Access Management in a cloud environment:

- Introduction to Identity in a cloud environment
- Identity architecture for the Cloud
- Identity Federation

<sup>109</sup> DMZ - DeMilitarized Zone

<sup>110</sup> DS or "Directory Service" is used through this section as an abbreviation for a generic corporate directory service, used for username and password login.

<sup>111</sup> Typically humans; for a wider definition and expansion refer to [www.opengroup.org/fericho/fericho%20Forum%20Identity%20Commandments%20v1.0.pdf](http://www.opengroup.org/fericho/fericho%20Forum%20Identity%20Commandments%20v1.0.pdf)

<sup>112</sup> Code includes all forms of code, up to including applications and self-protecting data.

<sup>113</sup> "Entitlement" is the process of mapping privileges (e.g., access to an application or its data) to identities and the related attributes.

<sup>114</sup> De-perimeterization is a term coined by the Jericho Forum® ([www.jerichoforum.org](http://www.jerichoforum.org))




Figure 1: Generic Identity, Entitlement, and Access Management

Table 1— Simple Entitlement Matrix for a Cloud HR Application

Claim / Attribute	Corporate HR Managers Access	User Corporate Access	Corporate HR Managers Home Access (Corp. Laptop)	User Home Access (Own Device)
ID: Organization Id	Valid	Valid	Valid	No
ID: User Identifier	Valid	Valid	Valid	Valid
ID: Device	Valid	Valid	Valid	No
Attrib: Device is clean	Valid	Valid	Valid	Unknown
Attrib: Device is patched	Valid	Valid	Valid	Unknown
Attrib: Device IP (is on corp. net. ?)	Valid	Valid	No	No
Attrib: User is HR manager	Valid	No	Valid	No
Access Result	Read/write access to all HR accounts	Read/write access to users HR account only	Read/write access to users HR account only	Read-only access to users HR account only

# Summary & Conclusions

- Your organisation should have a robust identity strategy
- An assertion (or claims) based model should be at the heart of your strategy
- Plan to deliver strong identities for all objects (People, Devices, Code, Organisations, Agents) and not just people
- Plan to consume identities from many sources and for many object types
- Getting identity right will allow faster, more secure, and more flexible collaborative business relationships

# Related Reading

**JERiCHO**  
White Paper  
Business rationale for de-perimeterisation

**History**  
Comparing history can be defined in terms of increasing connectivity over time, starting from an connectivity to the increased connectivity we currently have today with attacks of expense connectivity related their managed perimeter.

**Today**  
Today there are key indicators that every organisation will be seeing within their business that indicate a de-perimeterised future:

- The increasing maturity of the (Digital) business leader and the network perimeter in business relationships becomes less distinct
- Business demanding to directly interconnect systems where B2B relationships exist
- The need to have good network connectivity and access with all organisations with whom you have a business relationship
- Distributed / cloud applications across business relationships
- Increasing applications using technology that improves firewall security in the perimeter (typically using Web-based techniques that are implemented beyond the perimeter)
- Increasing maturity of traditional firewall and other network perimeter controls to consider solutions that use Web and/or cloud based techniques

Version 1.0 August 2007

Business rationale for de-perimeterisation

**JERiCHO**  
Jericho Forum Commandments

The Jericho Forum commandments define both the areas and the principles that must be observed when planning for a de-perimeterised future. Whilst building on "good security", the commandments specifically address those areas of security that are necessary to deliver a de-perimeterised vision. The commandments serve as a benchmark by which concepts, solutions, standards and systems can be assessed and measured.

**Fundamentals**

- The scope and level of protection must be specific & appropriate to the asset at risk**
  - Business demands that security enables business agility and is cost effective
  - Unless boundary firewalls may continue to provide basic network protection, individual systems and data will need to be capable of protecting themselves
  - In general, it's easier to protect an asset the closer protection is provided
- Security mechanisms must be pervasive, simple, scalable & easy to manage**
  - Unnecessary complexity is a threat to good security
  - Cobwebbed security principles are required which span all tiers of the architecture
  - Security mechanisms must evolve from small objects to large objects
  - To be both simple and scalable, unmanageable security "building blocks" need to be capable of being combined to provide the required security mechanisms
- Assume context at your peril!**
  - Security solutions designed for one environment may not be transferable to work in another. Thus it is important to understand the limitations of any security solution
  - Problems, limitations and issues can come from a variety of sources, including geographic, legal, cultural, responsibility of risk, etc.

**Surviving in a hostile world**

- Devices and applications must communicate using open, secure protocols**
  - Security through obscurity is a flawed assumption - secure protocols demand open peer review to provide robust assessment and thus wide acceptance and use
  - The security requirements of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) should be assessed and built in to protocols as appropriate, not add-on
  - Encrypted encapsulation should only be used where appropriate and does not solve everything
- All devices must be capable of maintaining their security policy on an untrusted network**
  - A "security policy" defines the rules with regard to the protection of the asset
  - Rules must be complete with respect to an arbitrary context
  - Any implementation must be capable of surviving on the raw Internet, e.g., will not break on any input

Version 1.0 April 2006

Jericho Forum Commandments

**JERiCHO**  
"Identity" Commandments

The Jericho Forum's Identity, Enforcement & Access Management (IEA) Commandments define the principles that must be observed when planning an identity eco-system. Whilst building on "good practice", these commandments specifically address those areas that will allow "identity" providers to operate in a global, de-perimeterised world. The commandments are supported by a Jericho Forum IEA Glossary and other related documents. They also build on the higher level Jericho Forum Commandments, in particular Commandments 2, 3, 4 and 10.

The IEA commandments serve as a benchmark by which Identity, Enforcement and Access Management concepts, solutions, standards and systems can be assessed and measured. They are supported by a Jericho Forum IEA Glossary and other related documents. They also build on the higher level Jericho Forum Commandments, in particular Commandments 2, 3, 4 and 10.

**Identity and Core Identity**

- All core identities must be protected to ensure their secrecy and integrity**
  - Core identities' user names need to be disclosed and an integrity and verifiability associated with the related Entity
  - Core identities must have a verifiable level of confidentiality
  - Core identities must only be connected to a person via a one-way linkage (one-way trust)
  - An Entity has Primary over all the identities and activities of its personae
  - Entities must never be compelled to reveal a person, or that two (or more) persons are linked to the same "core identity"
- Identities must be able to De-Trust**
  - Identities must be appropriately unique and allowed to the entity's core identities to enable a defensible level of (primary) trust of the entity to exist
  - The identifier for a person (even if used pseudo-anonymously) can be used to develop impersonational trust of that person, for example for credit transactions
  - The identifier for a person when linked to other attributes or other persons can develop contextual trust, for example link-ups to government issued attributes / identities
- The authoritative source of identity will be the unique identifier\* or credentials offered by the personae representing that entity**
  - Entities have primary over all linkups of their personae with their public identities
  - The strength of the identity offered will define the level of trust that can be placed in the related personae, especially when a verified identifier or verifiable credentials are offered

**Multiple Identities (Personae)**

- An Entity can have multiple, separate Personae (Identities) and related unique identifiers\***
  - A Principal or resource owner may choose when to create a Personae (Identity) and related Unique Identifier, and which attributes are connected to that personae

\* Unique Identifier (UID) and \* Unique Identifier (UID) are not to be confused with the term "unique identifier" which is used in the context of digital identity. A UID is a unique identifier that is used to identify a person or entity. A UID is not a unique identifier that is used to identify a person or entity. A UID is not a unique identifier that is used to identify a person or entity. A UID is not a unique identifier that is used to identify a person or entity.

Version 1.0 May 2007

Jericho Forum Identity Commandments

Freely available at [www.jerichoforum.org](http://www.jerichoforum.org)